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Demystifying Disclosure: First Steps 
RONALD A. PEARLMAN* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The subject of tax shelters is such a difficult topic. We struggle for a 
definition; we debate whether there is a problem; and we search for a 
response. David Weisbach's article offers 10 propositions about tax 
shelters and tax avoidance.1 He synthesizes a number of important 
considerations and offers some very helpful insights. Weisbach has 
made a timely contribution to the tax shelter literature. 
Weisbach's fourth proposition relates to disclosure. Essentially, he 
concludes that the focus on disclosure is misplaced, primarily because 
the tax shelter problem is one of substantive law. He also fears that 
private sector support for disclosure is prompted by self-interest.2 I 
do not dwell on Weisbach's assertion regarding private sector motives 
because I consider the assertion to be largely irrelevant to the discus-
sion. If he intends merely to urge policymakers to exercise caution in 
considering tax disclosure options that are supported by the private 
sector, he does no harm. If, on the other hand, he succeeds in tainting 
enhanced disclosure proposals, he will have damaged the considera-
tion of an important response to the tax shelter problem without any 
real discussion of the merits. 
I have chosen to discuss tax shelter disclosure for two reasons. 
First, I think much of the tax shelter problem is attributable to the 
historic lack of effective tax enforcement. Second, unlike Weisbach, I 
think enhanced disclosure-that is, some level of disclosure over and 
above that required by current law and administrative practice-
would contribute to improved enforcement and increase voluntary 
compliance. After some preliminary comments, I discuss three func-
tions of a mandatory tax return disclosure regime. I then address 
some important implementation issues. I identify potentially relevant 
tax compliance literature, although my review of the literature has not 
* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. I thank Mindy Barry for her research 
assistance. I received helpful comments from Stuart Brown, Stephen Cohen, Phillip Mann, 
and Ronald Schultz. 
1 David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 Tax L. Rev. 215 (2002) [herein-
after Ten Truths]. 
2 Id. at 229-31; see also David A. Weisbach, The Failure of Disclosure as an Approach 
to Shelters, 54 SMU L. Rev. 73, 75-79 (2001). 
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been exhaustive. My discussion also refers to Treasury's temporary 
and proposed disclosure regulations3 and certain legislative proposals 
for enhanced disclosure, but I do not undertake a complete analysis of 
either. I refer to Weisbach's specific comments about disclosure at 
appropriate points in my discussion. 
The definition of "tax shelter" is particularly important to this dis-
cussion because it affects perceptions of the existence of a problem 
and influences deliberations on administrative and legislative re-
sponses. From a tax policy perspective, it is appropriate to encompass 
within the definition every action that reduces a taxpayer's liability 
from a normative baseline without regard to whether the action is sup-
ported by current law. For example, a transaction that takes advan-
tage of the low income housing credit,4 although structured to comply 
with the law, constitutes a tax shelter under this definition. I under-
stand Weisbach to be making essentially the same point in the discus-
sion of his second proposition, relating to references to a right to 
minimize taxes and to legitimate tax planning.5 
From a tax enforcement perspective, the tax policy definition of tax 
shelter is too broad. When used to analyze a taxpayer's proper tax 
liability, the focus must be limited to tax planning that may not be 
supported by current law. Therefore, I suggest a narrower definition, 
one that is intended to cover an action that reduces a taxpayer's tax 
liability if there is any possibility that the action does not comply with 
current law. Obviously, this narrower definition remains very broad. 
Only by a broad definition would it be possible for the Service to iden-
tify a potentially infinite range of questionable transactions and re-
porting positions. By "action," I mean to include both specific 
transactions and interpretations of current law on which tax return 
reporting positions are based. Because I wish to include the tax shel-
ter activities of individuals and unincorporated enterprises, as well as 
corporations, I use the term "tax shelter" to refer to the actions of any 
and all taxpayers. I do not refer to "corporate tax shelter" because 
this label suggests that the problem is one of corporate taxpayers 
alone. The tax shelter definition that I have adopted for this discus-
sion excludes a purposive standard, such as contained in 
§ 6662(d)(2)(C)6 or in various disclosure proposals.7 I also would pre-
fer to avoid any subjectivity. I have been unable to craft a definition 
3 Temp. Reg. § 1.6011-4T, as amended by T.D. 8961, 2001-35I.R.B. 194 (Aug. 27) [here-
inafter Temporary Regulations]. The Temporary Regulations also were issued in proposed 
form. Prop. Reg. § 1.6011-4, as amended by 66 Fed. Reg. 41169 (Aug. 7, 2001). 
4 IRC § 42. 
5 Weisbach, Ten Truths, note 1, at 220-2. 
6 IRC § 6662( d) (2) (C) (iii) (A tax shelter exists "if a significant purpose of such partner-
ship, entity, plan or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of federal income tax."). 
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that does so. My definition limits subjectivity, but does not eliminate 
it. I recognize that many actions will come within this tax enforce-
ment definition even though they may comply with current law. This 
is intentional. My objective is to create a shorthand reference to ac-
tions that justify appropriate administrative and judicial review, even 
if the actions ultimately are found to comply with current law. 
Recent tax shelter activity concerns me and causes me to conclude 
that a serious problem exists. Unlike Weisbach, I am not convinced 
that most tax shelters work; that is, that they comply with current 
law.8 At this relatively early stage in the tax shelter enforcement pro-
cess, I think it is impossible to reach any informed conclusion. Thus, 
unless tax shelters are audited and challenged when appropriate, 
those that do not work will reduce government receipts. Second, al-
though I am unaware of any documented link between aggressive tax 
behavior by business organizations and a decline in individual tax 
compliance, my intuition is that the likelihood of such a link exists.9 I 
believe that individual taxpayers are influenced by their perception of 
the level of tax compliance by others, including business organiza-
tions. Third, I am concerned by an increasing level of aggressiveness 
by tax shelter promoters, taxpayers, and their advisors in designing 
and undertaking transactions in which there appears to be no material 
nontax motive. Most often this activity is wasteful and corrodes re-
sponsible and ethical behavior. 
Were there a consensus on the proposition that a tax shelter prob-
lem exists, policymakers and analysts nevertheless would disagree 
about its underlying cause. Some maintain that current law enables 
well-advised taxpayers to enter into transactions or take tax return 
reporting positions because of substantive law infirmities. If existing 
law is the problem, Congress and the administration should respond 
appropriately. The response might be a fundamental reform of the 
income tax, either abandoning the current system or substantially re-
forming it as Treasury proposed in 1984.10 Alternatively, the substan-
7 See, e.g., 1 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 106th Cong., Study of Present-Law 
Penalty and Interest Provisions as Required by Section 3801 of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (Including Provisions Relating to Corporate 
Tax Shelters) 6-7 (Comm. Print 1999),1999 TNT 142-72, July 26,1999, available at LEXIS, 
Tax Analysts File [hereinafter Joint Committee Tax Shelter Study] ("[A]lthough it may be 
difficult to define precisely what it means to be a corporate tax shelter, a general principle 
should focus on a significant purpose to avoid or evade Federal income tax and be elabo-
rated upon by more objective standards .... "). 
8 Weisbach, Ten Truths, note 1, at 228. 
9 Evidence of a possible link may be inferred from the hostile reactions of two individual 
taxpayers to a report of recent business tax shelter activity. See Ben Stanger & Pragna 
Patel, Letters to the Editor, N.Y. Tunes, Dec. 26, 2000, at A30. 
10 Treasury Dep't, Report to the President: Tax Reform For Fairness, Simplicity, and 
Economic Growth (1984). 
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tive law response might focus on specific defects in current law and 
respond through legislative changes as issues arise. The recent addi-
tion of § 357(d) is an example of such a limited response. The sub-
stantive law response also might consist of broad anti-tax shelter rules, 
for example, a statutory economic substance doctrine, an anti-abuse 
rule modeled after the passive loss rules of § 469, or a heightened tax 
return filing standard, such as a requirement that certain reporting po-
sitions be allowed only by claim for refund. 
Weisbach urges consideration of substantive law changes.H I think 
his suggestion has merit; however, I do not think a primary focus on 
the substantive law will suffice. I reach this conclusion because I think 
there is at least one other important causal explanation of the tax shel-
ter problem-namely, the historic lack of effective tax enforcement. I 
believe that some tax shelter transactions do not work under current 
law. Some are defective because the purported transaction on which 
the taxpayer's return positions are based is not supported by actual 
facts; others are based on erroneous interpretations or applications of 
the statute; and still others fail to take into account relevant judicial 
doctrines, such as economic purpose, business purpose, and the step 
transaction doctrine. Tax shelters that do not work are not a substan-
tive law problem; they are primarily a tax enforcement problem, and 
they require an enforcement response. 
Developing an appropriate set of responses to the tax shelter prob-
lem is difficult, but one point seems clear to me. No single response 
likely will suffice. I share Weisbach's view that implementation of an 
enhanced disclosure regime is not enough.12 I also see little reason to 
think, however, that substantive law changes will serve as a complete 
response if lack of enforcement encourages a low level of voluntary 
compliance. Moreover, substantive law changes, particularly bold leg-
islative proposals, may never be enacted and certainly do not appear 
imminent. Whatever the state of the substantive law, effective en-
forcement should encourage a reasonable level of compliance and fur-
ther inform policymakers of substantive law defects. Therefore, in 
ranking the components of a comprehensive response to the tax shel-
ter problem, I list first the scope and effectiveness of the Service's tax 
shelter enforcement response. I do not think the Service possesses the 
enforcement tools necessary to mount an effective attack on tax shel-
ters-thus, my interest in disclosure. 
This Article relates primarily to tax return disclosure, although I 
also refer to "early warning" disclosure, that is, pre-tax return disclo-
sure by taxpayers and third parties. My hypothesis is that an ex-
11 Weisbach, Ten Truths, note 1, at 251-53. 
12 Id. at 225-30. 
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panded tax return disclosure regime-what I refer to as "enhanced 
disclosure"-coupled with vigorous enforcement activity by the Ser-
vice would uncover and discourage many defective tax shelters. This 
conclusion is based primarily on personal experience as a tax practi-
tioner and on intuition. Available data are insufficient to validate this 
view. I have found no empirical research on the effectiveness of tax 
return disclosure by business organizations, and I have no actual infor-
mation about the impact of the temporary regulations on the Service's 
audit capability or on deterrence. Thus, I recognize that my conclu-
sion may be incorrect, and I invite challenge by those who think that 
my analysis is incomplete or otherwise defective. To the extent this 
discussion suggests the need for additional empirical research, I hope 
that it stimulates further inquiry. 
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR MORE VIGOROUS TAX SHELTER ENFORCEMENT 
Not everyone shares my concern with the current tax shelter envi-
ronment and, thus, my interest in increasing tax enforcement.13 For 
example, efforts to improve enforcement and compliance may not in-
terest those who view a weakening of the revenue-raising capacity of 
the current income tax as a way to reduce the size of government or to 
enhance popular support for an alternative tax system. Others may 
not be interested in enhancing compliance with a tax perceived to be 
inappropriate, such as the corporate income tax. Still others seem to 
believe that all tax planning is appropriate under current law-assum-
ing that it is legal, whatever that means.14 
I think most students of the tax system would accept as a normative 
matter the simple application of the rule of law; taxpayers should be 
expected to comply with current law as finally determined by the 
courts even if they disagree with the underlying tax policy. Most also 
would agree that effective enforcement is necessary if tax-motivated 
transactions are to be held to this standard. If one believes that effec-
tive enforcement is important, it is not much of a leap to also support 
the serious consideration, if not endorsement, of the possible role of 
enhanced disclosure in improving enforcement. 
Mandatory tax return disclosure of information relating to tax-rele-
vant transactions potentially may serve three enforcement and com-
13 See Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., If You Can't Say Something Nice About Tax Shelters 
... , Wall St. J., June 27, 2001, at A17. 
14 Ryan J. Donmoyer, GOP Leadership: Shelter Problem, What Shelter Problem?, 86 
Tax Notes 1039 (Feb. 2, 2000) (quoting House Majority Leader Richard K. Armey as stat-
ing, "The business of a corporation is . . . to maximize its earnings for its shareholders. 
Since tax is a very large part of their costs, anything they can do to minimize that share of 
their costs would be a legitimate thing. Obviously, they need to do what is legal, and we 
presume they are doing that."). 
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pliance functions. First, disclosure may provide information that 
assists an IRS agent in evaluating the effect of a transaction on the 
disclosing party's tax liability. I refer to this role of return disclosure 
as the audit function. Second, disclosure may constitute an important 
source of information for considering administrative and legislative 
responses to a particular transaction or to perceived broader defects 
in current law. I refer to this role as the tax policy function. Third, the 
existence of a meaningful return disclosure regime may discourage 
taxpayer investment in particularly questionable transactions. I refer 
to this role as the deterrence function. 
A. The Audit Function of Return Disclosure 
Improvement in tax enforcement is the primary reason for imple-
menting an enhanced disclosure regime, even though the tax policy 
and deterrence functions of return disclosure are potentially very im-
portant. The discussion of the audit function in this subsection ana-
lyzes two assertions: (1) Because of the inadequacy of return 
information, the Service needs enhanced disclosure to enable revenue 
agents to effectively identify and analyze tax shelters. (2) To protect 
the revenue agent's "right to know," the category of transactions sub-
ject to an enhanced disclosure regime should be overly broad rather 
than unduly narrow. 
1. Inadequacy of Return Information 
Section 6001 grants Treasury very broad authority to require tax-
payers to provide information relevant to the determination of their 
tax liabilities. Taxpayers must file tax returns in the particular form 
specified, provide other necessary information, and maintain appro-
priate records. In spite of Treasury's broad authority and the fact that 
tax returns do include questions and mandated schedules intended to 
amplify the line-item entries on the returns, the current level of return 
disclosure, absent an enhanced disclosure regime such as that at-
tempted in the temporary regulations,15 does not enable revenue 
agents to identify certain tax shelters. I use a hypothetical corporate 
tax audit to illustrate this point. 
Assume that a Fortune 1000 corporate taxpayer files its tax return 
with all relevant numerical lines completed but without responding to 
the return's narrative questions and without completing any required 
schedules. During the course of the audit, the revenue agent asks the 
taxpayer's agent or representative to explain a specific numerical en-
15 Temporary Regulations, note 3. 
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.D. Tax Law Review 
HeinOnline -- 55 Tax L. Rev. 295 2001-2002
2002] DEMYSTIFYING DISCLOSURE 295 
try, for example, the facts underlying a loss that offsets a substantial 
gain. The taxpayer refuses to provide the requested explanation or 
information, but, hypothetically, the agent has no statutory authority 
to compel a response. Without the ability to inquire beyond the line-
item entries, the agent would be unable to evaluate the propriety of 
the return. Essentially, the agent would be limited to checking the 
mathematical accuracy of the return. 
Of course, this scenario is neither representative of current law nor 
consistent with the circumstances of a typical audit, at least one that 
does not involve a criminal investigation. Nevertheless, it is relevant 
to a discussion of tax shelters. The hypothetical facts often are not far 
from the circumstances faced by a revenue agent looking for the tax 
shelter needle in the haystack of a complicated business tax return. To 
obtain an accurate picture of a tax shelter audit, it is necessary to ap-
preciate the inordinate complexity of the income tax return of a large 
multinational business, in particular, the extraordinary volume of 
transactions underlying the numerical entries on the return. A large 
number of these transactions would be described as tax-motivated 
(tax shelters under my tax enforcement definition) even though they 
are not necessarily improper or otherwise illegal. 
In addition to the sheer volume of transactions encompassed within 
the line-item entries, consider also the format of existing return disclo-
sures, particularly Schedule M-l of Form 1120, the corporate income 
tax return. A 10-line schedule that constitutes a part of Form 1120, 
Schedule M-l requires the corporate taxpayer to reconcile its financial 
accounting (book) income with the income it reports on its tax return. 
Some of the information required by Schedule M-l is very general; 
the information provided often lacks sufficient detail to enable a reve-
nue agent to identify any underlying transaction. Other information is 
required in great detail, resulting in the submission of large amounts 
of data. Consider, for example, line 5a of Schedule M-l, relating to 
depreciation. Imagine the number of depreciation entries that must 
be disclosed in order to comply with the itemization requirement of 
line 5a. Yet, in spite of the large volume of data, how does the infor-
mation assist an agent in determining, for example, whether a specific 
leasing transaction complies with the Service's leveraged lease guide-
lines? It does not; indeed, it may not even identify the leasing 
transaction. 
Similarly, the book-tax component of Schedule M-l of a multina-
tional corporation reflects thousands of entries, including book-tax 
differences resulting from depreciation, nonqualified stock options, 
leveraged lease transactions, goodwill, and research and development 
expenditures. It often is impossible for a revenue agent to identify tax 
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shelter transactions from available Schedule M-1 data. The partner-
ship version of Schedule M-1 does not even require the disclosure of 
book-tax differences. Even less information is required of an unincor-
porated sole proprietor on Schedule C to Form 1040. In spite of Weis-
bach's lack of enthusiasm for enhanced disclosure, he concedes that 
efforts to improve disclosure on Schedule M may be useful.16 The 
Temporary Regulations attempt to do just thatP Indeed, it would be 
easy to implement Weisbach's suggestion by labeling the required tax 
shelter disclosure statement as Schedule M-3. 
Consider another example of current tax return disclosure. Form 
1118, the corporate foreign tax credit form, requires the taxpayer to 
identify each foreign tax for which it claims a foreign tax credit. Imag-
ine the foreign tax position of a large multinational corporation. It 
pays hundreds, if not thousands, of foreign taxes to numerous national 
and subnational jurisdictions. Assume that a particular tax shelter 
transaction involves the aggressive claim of a foreign tax credit. With-
out any information other than the entries on Form 1118, it is unlikely 
that a revenue agent, no matter how sophisticated, would be able to 
identify the questionable claim. 
Return now to the facts of my fictitious audit. Assume that the rev-
enue agent identifies data on the return or an accompanying schedule 
that causes her to inquire about a particular entry. For example, as-
sume that a revenue agent on the examination team gives the taxpayer 
an Information Document Request seeking explanations of the 50 
largest foreign tax payments for which the taxpayer claims credits. 
The corporation's agent or representative explains that it will take a 
substantial effort and considerable time to comply with the request. 
The revenue agent agrees to allow the taxpayer one month to prepare 
the response. One month passes, and the revenue agent receives no 
response. Two months pass, and no response is forthcoming. Each 
month the revenue agent inquires about the status of the request, and 
the company representative states, "We're working on it." Finally, the 
examination team completes the audit except for a review of the for-
eign tax credits that are the subject of the Information Document Re-
quest. The case manager responsible for the audit has a choice: Does 
he defer the formal completion of the examination until he receives 
the response, perhaps summonsing the information from an uncooper-
ative taxpayer, or does he accede to his supervisor's directive to forget 
the delinquent IDR response, close the audit, and move on? 
Public information does not permit an accurate evaluation of the 
problems facing revenue agents in their search for and analysis of tax 
16 Weisbach, Ten Truths, note 1, at 227. 
17 Temporary Regulations, note 3. 
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shelters in the course of an audit. There is some published evidence of 
difficulties experienced by agents in timely obtaining helpful informa-
tion in the case of audits of large taxpayers, although the information 
is dated. A 1994 General Accounting Office study of large corporate 
audits states that most IRS Coordinated Examination Program team 
coordinators reported that they did not receive information requested 
from taxpayers in a timely manner, and 30% of the team coordinators 
reported that they had to close audits without having obtained the 
information.1s 
Even in the absence of more information on impediments to an ef-
fective audit, it is not hard to imagine the difficulties facing revenue 
agents. Many tax shelter transactions are exceedingly complex. The 
tax effects may be buried within a large dollar entry on a particular 
line of the tax return or they may be reflected in several entries. Some 
transactions are comprised of subtransactions, each of which must be 
reviewed in order to understand the whole. Some involve foreign en-
tities that do not file U.S. tax returns. Some may look quite innocent 
unless the tax effects are considered on a multiyear basis. In the audit 
of a complex business tax return, unless the revenue agent has very 
precise information about potentially questionable transactions, he 
will miss some of them no matter how smart he is, no matter what 
level of training he has, and no matter what statutory authority he 
possesses to obtain information from the taxpayer. In such circum-
stances, the agent needs information regarding the particular transac-
tion, either information that the Service has obtained from some other 
source or additional information obtained from the taxpayer.19 En-
hanced disclosure is one method of obtaining useful additional 
information. 
We do not know how many of the litigated tax shelters and other 
cases in the audit pipeline came to the examining agents' attention 
through return information, through discussions with the taxpayers 
during the course of the audits, or through information provided by 
industry specialists, the IRS National Office, or third-party sources. 
Although the data are not clear, it appears that promoters have regis-
tered at least 1,268 confidential corporate tax shelters since Septem-
18 GAO, Tax Administration, Compliance Measures and Audits of Large Corporations 
Need Improvement (Sept. 1, 1994), 94 TNT 205-13, Oct. 19, 1994, available at LEXIS, Tax 
Analysts File [hereinafter GAO Report]. (The Coordinated Examination Program now is 
called the Large Case Audit Program.) It also is useful to recall instances in which taxpay-
ers may have sought to obstruct the progress of an audit by resisting the Service's request 
for information. See, e.g., United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1158 (C.D. 
Cal. 1983) (Service sought foreign parent data). 
19 Randall Smith & John McKinnon, IRS, Merrill Reach Pact on Shelters, Wall St. J., 
Aug. 29, 2001, at C1 (quoting Richard Andersen as stating, "The only really effective en-
forcement mechanism they have is disclosure."). 
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ber 200020 and that taxpayers have filed 144 tax shelter disclosure 
statements.21 Although no information relating to the specific trans-
actions disclosed is publicly available, I would be surprised if these 
submissions have brought no transactions to the attention of revenue 
agents of which they otherwise were unaware. 
2. The Revenue Agent's Right to Know 
My second assertion regarding the audit function of mandated dis-
closure relates to the desirable breadth of disclosure. In suggesting 
the need for a broad standard, I begin with a fundamental proposition 
that I caption "the revenue agent's right to know." The proposition is 
very straightforward: The Service is entitled to know all of the facts 
related to any taxpayer action that is relevant to a proper determina-
tion of its tax liability. 
From a taxpayer's perspective, an action,22 may appear to be clearly 
correct under current law-the result of legitimate tax planning. Even 
so, the revenue agent is entitled to review the action. For example, an 
agent is entitled to seek the facts on every reorganization as defined in 
§ 368(a)(1)(B) to which a corporate taxpayer was a party during the 
relevant audit period in order to determine whether the "solely for 
voting stock" requirement was satisfied. Indeed, for many years, the 
regulations have required taxpayers to report garden-variety reorgani-
zations as well as other routine transactions in addenda to their tax 
returns.23 To my knowledge, taxpayers have not challenged these dis-
closure requirements nor do they argue that the disclosures impede 
legitimate transactions. There is no basis for the assertion that a reve-
nue agent may not review a particular transaction because it consti-
tutes legitimate tax planning. 
Consistent with the revenue agent's right to know, the Service also 
is entitled to seek additional information from taxpayers in advance of 
an audit in the form of a targeted tax return disclosure if it determines 
that such a disclosure will aid in the audit selection process, in devel-
oping the audit plan once a return is selected for examination, or 
merely because it determines that certain transactions cannot be read-
ily identified by the revenue agents during the course of the audit on 
20 John E. Hembera, Jr., Corporate Tax Shelter Scrutiny Continues, IRS Official Says, 
2001 TNT 188-8, Sept. 27, 2001, available at LEXIS, Tax Analysts File. 
21 Brant Goldwyn, Tax Shelters: IRS Tax Shelter Office Pursuing Promoters, Enforcing 
Registration and Disclosure Rules, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Sept. 25, 2001, at G4. 
22 I previously defined "action" to include specific transactions and interpretations of 
current law on which tax return reporting positions are based. See text following note 5. 
23 Reg. § 1.368-3; see also Reg. § 1.351-3 (disclosure for incorporation transactions); 
§ 1.302-4(a)(1) (disclosure relating to § 302(b)(3) waivers); § 1.1033(a)-2(c)(2) (disclosure 
relating to involuntary conversions). 
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the basis of existing tax return information. This is a simple extension 
of the agent's right to know. As with an agent's inquiries during the 
audit, there is no basis for arguing that enhanced disclosure may not 
include information about a particular category of transactions merely 
because the category constitutes legitimate tax planning. 
If there is merit to the assertion that the Service is entitled to obtain 
information deemed relevant to a determination of the taxpayer's lia-
bility, why do private sector comments on enhanced tax shelter disclo-
sure complain about the adverse effect of disclosure on legitimate tax 
planning? For example, the Financial Executives Institute stated that 
the temporary regulations will cause taxpayers to feel at risk when 
engaging in widely accepted and entirely appropriate transactions.24 
The Federal Taxation Committee of the Chicago Bar Association as-
serted that "certain elements of the [Temporary] Regulations ... will 
result in unwarranted disclosure ... [of] transactions which are clearly 
supported by the tax law and are generally accepted."25 Even the 
ABA Tax Section, which was an early proponent of enhanced disclo-
sure, recently complained that the temporary regulations will result in 
the disclosure of a large volume of transactions that are not corporate 
tax shelters.26 
There are at least three possible reasons for assertions that en-
hanced disclosure poses a threat to legitimate tax planning. First, it 
may be good politics. Taxpayers and their advisors realize that en-
hanced disclosure enables a revenue agent to more readily identify 
and challenge questionable transactions. By claiming that disclosure 
will impede legitimate tax planning, opponents of enhanced disclosure 
may succeed in eliciting an accommodating political response, such as 
Senator Charles E. Grassley's statement that the Senate Finance 
Committee is studying ways to address tax shelter abuses "without 
interfering with legitimate business transactions."27 
Rhetoric about legitimate tax planning is inevitable. It is important, 
however, that congressional staff working on proposed disclosure leg-
islation, as well as the Service and the Treasury, keep this possible 
24 Letter From Joe o. Luby, Jr., Chairman, Fm. Executives Inst. Comm. on Tax'n, to 
Jonathan Talisman, Treas. Acting Asst. Sec. (Tax Pol'y) (June 28, 2000), 2000 TNT 136-29, 
July 14, 2000, available at LEXIS, Tax Analysts FIle. 
25 Douglas J. Antonio, Chair, Fed. Tax Comm., Chicago Bar Ass'n, Comments on Pro-
posed and Temporary Regulations Under Code Sections 6011, 6111, and 6112 Dealing 
With Registration of Corporate Tax Shelters (May 17, 2000), 2000 TNT 102-27, May 25, 
2000, available at LEXIS, Tax Analysts FIle. 
26 Richard M. Lipton, Chair, ABA Tax Sec., Comments on Draft Tax Shelter Legislation 
(Sept. 6, 2001), 2001 TNT 174-14, Sept. 7,2001, available at LEXIS, Tax Analysts FIle 
[hereinafter ABA Comments]. 
27 Heidi Glenn, Patti Mohr & Fred Stokeld, TEl Meeting-Congressional Leaders Say 
AMT FIx, Corporate Tax Breaks on Horizon, 91 Tax Notes 210, 211 (Apr. 9, 2001). 
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political motivation in mind. It is particularly important that Congress 
not leave the impression that a taxpayer's right to tax plan places lim-
its on a revenue agent's right to know. Congressional committee re-
port language that seeks to limit the Service's ability to obtain 
information considered relevant to a tax audit under the guise of an 
impediment to legitimate transactions could have negative long-term 
implications that extend beyond tax shelters. 
Beyond the obvious self-interest that may motivate attempts to dis-
credit disclosure proposals by linking them to legitimate tax planning, 
there are two more substantive reasons underlying an asserted "dis-
closure-legitimate transaction" link, namely, the relationship of disclo-
sure to the accuracy-related penalty and taxpayer burden. 
The primary reason for private sector references to the potential 
impact of enhanced disclosure on legitimate tax planning results from 
the fact that the design of a disclosure regime intended to serve as an 
effective audit tool has become intertwined with the accuracy-related 
penalty.28 For example, the preamble to the tax shelter disclosure reg-
ulations states that failure to disclose may affect the taxpayer's expo-
sure to the accuracy-related and fraud penalties.29 The Senate 
Finance Committee staff's Tax Shelter Discussion Draft has an even 
more far-reaching impact by calling for a 40% penalty on a "tax shel-
ter understatement" unless, inter alia, "the relevant facts affecting the 
item's tax treatment are adequately disclosed in the return or in a 
statement attached to the return."30 Considering the importance of 
the definition of tax shelters under this proposed penalty structure, it 
is understandable that taxpayers and practitioners would focus on the 
definition and express concern that a broad statute may implicate so-
called legitimate transactions.31 On the other hand, if the design of an 
enhanced tax shelter disclosure requirement were separated from 
changes in the accuracy-related penalty, so that a new disclosure obli-
gation is viewed solely as a legislative expansion of § 6011, then the 
breadth of transactions subject to disclosure is less important and ar-
guments against catching "legitimate transactions" are considerably 
less persuasive. 
28 IRC § 6661 (prior to repeal in 1989). 
29 Preamble to Temp. Reg. § 1.6011-4T, T.D. 8877,2001-1 C.B. 747, 747. 
30 Staff of the Senate Finance Comm., 107th Cong., Discussion Draft of the Tax Shelter 
Disclosure Act (Aug. 3, 2001), 2001 TNT 151-58, Aug. 6, 2001, available at LEXIS, Tax 
Analysts File [hereinafter Finance Committee 2001 Draft]. 
31 See, e.g., Rachelle B. Bernstein, Coalition for the Fair Tax'n of Bus. Transactions, 
Comments on Temporary Tax Shelter Regulations (May 26, 2000), 2000 TNT 116-60, June 
15, 2000, available at LEXIS, Tax Analysts File ("[T]he members of the Coalition want to 
express their concern with the Administration's demonizing of taxpayers that are trying to 
plan transactions in a tax-efficient manner. The scope of the transaction ... impacted by 
Treasury's regulatory ... proposals goes well beyond 'tax shelters."'); Luby, note 24. 
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A final reason that legitimate transactions might be implicated by 
enhanced disclosure is private-sector concern with the inevitable addi-
tional administrative burden imposed on taxpayers by reason of a 
broadened disclosure requirement. If the standards for disclosure 
were broad, the amount of information that must be collected, re-
ported, and retained by taxpayers would increase, potentially signifi-
cantly. Taxpayers might understand and accept this burden in the case 
of transactions they perceive to be particularly aggressive; they would 
not understand the reason for this added burden if they were required 
to report transactions that they believe are clearly supported under 
current law. 
The potential burden of any new enforcement requirement is a le-
gitimate taxpayer concern, and taxpayers and practitioners should not 
be criticized for expressing this concern. One of the benefits of devel-
oping enhanced disclosure through the regulations process is the op-
portunity afforded the private sector to review and comment on the 
proposal. Unfortunately, complaints of taxpayer burden as a result of 
the temporary regulations have been quite general;32 the Service and 
the Treasury are entitled to greater specificity. Are there examples of 
situations in which taxpayers cannot comply with the reporting and 
recordkeeping burden? Are there specific matters that are required 
to be disclosed that are particularly burdensome? Does the early 
warning or return disclosure requirement create timing problems? 
For example, is the return preparer likely to receive the information 
too late in the return preparation process to enable the preparer to 
fully comply with the disclosure requirements? Is the preparer con-
cerned about relying on information provided from remote corporate 
sites by people who do not understand the disclosure requirements? 
Documentation of the specifics of taxpayer burden does not com-
plete the analysis; an inevitable tension exists between administrative 
burdens on the taxpayer and the Service's need for additional infor-
mation. The ultimate determination regarding the scope of enhanced 
disclosure should be left with the Service. It is in the best position to 
know what problems revenue agents face in the examination process 
and what additional information would most likely contribute to an 
efficient and effective audit. No rational administrative purpose is 
32 See, e.g., LaBrenda Garrett-Nelson, Nicholas P. Giordano, Gary J. Gasper & Mark 
A. Weinberger, Washington Council Ernst & Young, on Behalf of Tax Fairness Coalition, 
Comments on Corporate Tax Shelter Regulations (June 20, 2000), 2000 TNT 140-45, July 
20, 2000, available at LEXIS, Tax Analysts FIle [hereinafter Tax Fairness Coalition Com-
ments] (voluminous filing burdens); Kenneth J. Kies, PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, Com-
ments on "Corporate Tax Shelter" Disclosure Regulations (June 20, 2000), 2000 TNT 121-
14, June 22, 2000, available at LEXIS, Tax Analysts FIle (compliance will take significant 
time and impose significant document retention burden). 
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served by requiring taxpayers to disclose each and every tax-moti-
vated transaction. For example, a revenue agent will not be interested 
in the details of every purchase of depreciable property by a taxpayer 
that was motivated by a more favorable tax result when compared 
with a hypothetical lease of the property. Just as legitimate tax plan-
ning should not preclude disclosure, tax motivation (legitimate or oth-
erwise) cannot be the sole filter for enhanced disclosure. 
I am willing to assume that the Service's senior management has no 
desire to create paperwork that will not be productive. It has bigger 
fish to fry. Nevertheless, the Service should not be permitted to act in 
a vacuum. It should be expected to justify its demand for additional 
information to affected taxpayers, to Treasury colleagues, and ulti-
mately to Congress in the exercise of its oversight responsibility. 
The regulations process assures that the private sector will be heard 
and that Treasury will have its say. The regulations process, however, 
does not assure protection from behind-the-scenes pressure on the 
Service that waters down and substantially weakens the resulting dis-
closure regime. I am concerned about this prospect in connection 
with the temporary regulations. The temporary regulations, gener-
ously in my opinion, excuse a taxpayer from the duty to disclose if the 
taxpayer determines that there is no reasonable basis for denial of a 
significant portion of the tax benefits from a transaction.33 As if this 
were not enough, the ABA Tax Section recently suggested that in the 
case of a reportable transaction other than a listed transaction, within 
the meaning of Temp. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b), disclosure should not be 
required if the Service lacks substantial authority to support a chal-
lenge to the taxpayer's claimed treatment of the transaction.34 Simi-
larly, the Tax Fairness Coalition suggested in its comments on the 
Temporary Regulations that disclosure not be required if the taxpayer 
reasonably determines that the government does not have a realistic 
possibility of success in sustaining a challenge to the transaction.35 
I am troubled by these exceptions to a broad disclosure require-
ment. Authorizing the taxpayer to determine whether the Service has 
a sufficient basis for successfully challenging a transaction that the 
Service may never identify if there is no disclosure invites nondisclo-
sure and will result in controversies regarding the meaning of the stan-
dard and its applicability in particular cases. The standard is the 
33 Temp. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b)(3)(ii)(C). 
34 Pamela F. Olson, Chair, ABA Tax Sec., Comments Concerning Temporary and Pro-
posed Regulations Under Sections 6011, 6111, and 6112 of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 (Sept. 18, 2000), 2000 TNT 195-23, Oct. 6, 2000, available at LEXIS, Tax Analysts 
File. 
35 Tax Fairness Coalition Comments, note 32. 
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.D. Tax Law Review 
HeinOnline -- 55 Tax L. Rev. 303 2001-2002
2002] DEMYSTIFYING DISCLOSURE 303 
essence of enhanced disclosure.36 If disclosure is going to be effective, 
the net must be cast wide. 
Another criticism of enhanced tax shelter disclosure is that the Ser-
vice will be unable to effectively utilize the volume of additional infor-
mation.37 Frankly, I am suspicious of such private sector warnings. 
Do taxpayers really care whether the Service is overburdened? On 
the other hand, tax administrators should care. A disclosure require-
ment may be so broad that the volume of materials received by the 
Service does not aid the audit process. Indeed, enhanced disclosure 
may be counterproductive if the submission of a large volume of new 
documents succeeds in hiding questionable transactions. I assume 
that the Service and Treasury are sensitive to the potential for docu-
ment overload. Former Acting Chief Counsel Richard Skillman is re-
ported to have said that the key to the new disclosure was to empower 
the government to find out about potentially abusive transactions 
without "burying everybody in paperwork."38 If the Service over-
shoots and is overwhelmed, it will have erred in its design of the en-
hanced disclosure regime. As far as I am concerned, that is the 
Service's problem. 
Development and refinement of the tax shelter disclosure standard 
should be considered a dynamic hit-or-miss undertaking. The Service 
may choose to begin with a wide net because it is not fully aware of 
the numerous transactions in the marketplace. As its audit experience 
increases and as it evaluates transactions that are disclosed, it should 
be able to adjust the disclosure definition to better conform to the 
information that it needs. If the Service and Treasury have not al-
ready done so, they should apply the disclosure standards of the tem-
porary regulations to the facts of decided tax shelter cases and 
36 Son of Rusty Pipes, Shelter Insider Raises Important Issues, 91 Tax Notes 346, 346 
(Mar. 30, 2001) ("That standard is where the rubber meets the road in the entire disclosure 
scheme .... "). 
37 See Kenneth J. Kies, PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, Comments on Senate Fmance 
Comm. Corporate Tax Shelter Draft Legislation (June 9, 2000), 2000 TNT 117-12, June 16, 
2000, available at LEXIS, Tax Analysts File (Service would need to hire scores of employ-
ees; sheer volume of submissions would jeopardize the chance the proposal would identify 
questionable transactions); Luby, note 24 ("[T]he government likely will find itself inun-
dated with voluminous disclosures that will make it unwieldy at best (and impossible at 
worst) to use these disclosures in the fashion Treasury envisions."); John D. McKinnon, 
Professional Groups Criticize Tax-Shelter Rules, Wall St. J., June 12, 2000, at A2 (AICPA 
Tax Shelter Task Force "doesn't want Internal Revenue Service resources 'wasted on chas-
ing shadows."'); Sheryl Stratton, IRS Tax Shelter Office Geared Up to Handle More Dis-
closures, 91 Tax Notes 213, 214 (Apr. 9,2001) (reference to query by Neil D. Traubenberg, 
Storage Technology Corp., whether the Service is worried that it will get buried in paper, 
and reference to "disclosure overload" by David G. Harris, director, IRS Office of Tax 
Shelter Analysis). 
38 Christopher Bergin, Heidi Glenn & Warren Rojas, Top Officials Preview Upcoming 
Anti-Corporate-Shelter Initiative, 90 Tax Notes 1295, 1295 (Mar. 5, 2001). 
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relevant cases in the audit pipeline to determine those that would 
have come to the Service's attention without the temporary regula-
tions and those that likely would have escaped detection. With expe-
rience, I expect that the Service will adjust reportable transactions 
through notices and revenue procedures, excluding some existing 
transactions or categories and adding new transactions or different 
transactional characteristics. 
I wish to make two final points in connection with the audit func-
tion of disclosure, involving the potential consequences of enhanced 
disclosure in the audit process. The first relates to the possibility that 
enhanced disclosure will result in accelerated audits.39 The accelera-
tion of an audit may result in an earlier-than-usual denial of the tax 
benefits of a defective tax shelter or it may fail to provide time to fully 
develop the relevant facts or afford the taxpayer a full opportunity to 
explain its legal position. The second concern relates to the possibility 
that some revenue agents will characterize every disclosed transaction 
as an abusive transaction that is unsupported by current law rather 
than analyze the transaction to determine its merits.40 Absent experi-
ence, the audit-related procedural effects of disclosure are speculative; 
however, the Service must recognize that disclosure may change the 
dynamics of the audit, sometimes in an appropriate manner and some-
times inappropriately. It should implement procedures to minimize 
inappropriate consequences and provide a mechanism for dealing 
with situations that may arise in specific audits. 
B. The Tax Policy Function of Return Disclosure 
Information that comes to the attention of the Service in connection 
with the audit of a specific taxpayer, or by means of an early warning 
filing by the taxpayer or a promoter, may be useful for nonaudit pur-
poses, such as the development of administrative guidance in the form 
of notices, revenue rulings, and revenue procedures. The information 
also may serve as the basis for revised or new regulations, and it may 
be an important factual resource in considering substantive law 
changes. This serves an important tax policy function independent of 
the audit function. 
Weisbach describes the temporary regulations as a Washington-
based disclosure model.41 He states that current disclosure proposals 
are not well designed to increase the chance of successful audits be-
39 Stratton, note 37, at 214. 
40 Bergin et ai, note 38, at 1295 (quoting Kenneth Kies' statement that the disclosure 
rules have created a "scarlet letter effect" in the field, encouraging revenue agents to audit 
transactions that presumably Kies concluded should not have been examined). 
41 Weisbach, Ten Truths, note 1, at 227. 
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.D. Tax Law Review 
HeinOnline -- 55 Tax L. Rev. 305 2001-2002
2002] DEMYSTIFYING DISCLOSURE 305 
cause they require taxpayers to send information to Washington and, 
therefore, do not increase the chance of audit.42 'This is a puzzling 
statement because he also recognizes that taxpayers are required to 
include the disclosed information with their tax returns.43 Weisbach is 
correct that the early warning filing has a tax policy purpose,44 but 
there also are very important audit-related reasons for requiring tax-
payers to send information to Washington in advance of the filing of 
the tax return. The information becomes immediately available to 
subject matter experts in the National Office who may analyze the 
disclosed transactions in advance of the audits and thereby provide 
better support to revenue agents. Thus, imposition of a centralized 
pre-return filing requirement does not justify a mischaracterization of 
the audit function of the disclosure regime. As long as the disclosed 
information reaches the revenue agent through a return filing or from 
the National Office as a result of an early warning filing, the fact that 
the early warning disclosure also informs Washington policymakers is 
icing on the cake. 
c. The Deterrence Function of Return Disclosure 
The most intriguing aspect of enhanced disclosure is its potential 
deterrence effect. If taxpayers realize that the Service will know of 
the existence of tax shelters in which they participate and, accordingly, 
will be more likely to audit the transactions, they may be more reluc-
tant to engage in certain transactions in the first place. Just as impor-
tant, they also may analyze more carefully the legal merits of 
transactions in which they do engage, insist on factual accuracy, and 
anticipate the need for full factual documentation. 
It is clear that deterrence is one of the objectives of the Service's tax 
shelter compliance activities.45 There is anecdotal evidence that the 
temporary regulations may have had such an effect,46 although it is 
42 Id. at 226. 
43 Id. 
44 The "early warning" prong of the disclosure regulations is intended to "allow the IRS, 
the Treasury Department, and, to the extent necessary, the Congress sufficient time to 
react to and stop the spread of the latest fad of the corporate tax shelter genre." Treasury 
Dep't, The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters: Discussion, Analysis and Legislative Pro-
posals 84 (1999), 1999 TNT 127-12, July 2, 1999, available at LEXIS, Tax Analysts File 
[hereinafter Treasury Tax Shelter Study]. 
45 IRS Fact Sheet No. FS-200l-10 (Sept. 4, 2001), 2001 TNT 172-6, Sept. 5, 2001, availa-
ble at LEXIS, Tax Analysts File ("A critical part of the overall LSMB strategy is deterring 
the promotion of abusive tax shelters through specific regulations, including: ... Requir-
ing Taxpayers to Disclose 'Reportable Transactions."'). 
46 Alison Bennett, Corporate Shelters Declining, But Individual, Small Business Shel-
ters Rising, Olson Says, Daily Tax Report (BNA), Oct. 3, 2001, at G4 (quoting Pamela 
Olson, Deputy Ass't Treas. Sec. (Tax Pol'y): "The tax shelter problem on the corporate 
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also possible that the reported reduction in tax shelter activity was 
prompted by early court decisions in the Commissioner's favor or rec-
ognition that the Service was directing more enforcement resources to 
tax shelters. It is also possible that any observed reduction in tax shel-
ter activity was temporary. Recent taxpayer victories in tax shelter 
litigation may embolden the tax shelter industry. Nevertheless, my 
intuition and experience suggest that an enhanced disclosure regime 
will have a deterrence effect. In the absence of additional data, how-
ever, this judgment necessarily is speculative. My purpose in the fol-
lowing discussion is to briefly review some potentially relevant 
literature and identify the need for further analysis. The discussion 
begins with a reference to the audit lottery. 
Weisbach doubts that the audit lottery is the driving force behind 
the current tax shelter boom. Rather, the problem is the substantive 
law.47 If "audit lottery" is considered to encompass only taxpayer 
speculation regarding selection of a return for examination, he un-
doubtedly is correct, at least in the case of large corporate taxpayers 
that are continuously examined in the Coordinated Examination Pro-
gram. This view of the audit lottery is too narrow, however, when 
considering the manner in which sophisticated taxpayers evaluate tax 
shelters. It is important also to consider taxpayer speculation about 
the likelihood that a revenue agent will identify a particular tax shelter 
transaction in the course of an examination. I doubt that it would be 
possible to reliably quantify the extent to which sophisticated taxpay-
ers consider audit risk in deciding whether to engage in tax shelter 
activity. If asked, I assume that many, if not most, taxpayers would 
say "of course not." Thus, one must rely on anecdotes. 
Practitioners will have different views about the role of the audit 
lottery in tax planning decisions by business organizations. I think the 
relevance of the audit lottery on decisionmaking varies among taxpay-
ers. Some refuse to consider the audit lottery and make their deci-
sions whether to engage in a specific tax-motivated strategy on the 
basis of their analysis of the merits of the proposed transaction. 
Others have more of a gambler's instinct and tend to be interested in 
predictions of the likely consequences of an audit. While I do not 
think the audit lottery frequently is the determinative factor in making 
a tax shelter investment decision, based on my experience as well as 
that of colleagues in the private bar with whom I have discussed this 
topic, it often is a material factor and, thus, should not be ignored. 
level has diminished. I'm not saying that it's gone, but it has rapidly declined."); Goldwyn, 
note 21, at G4 (IRS Advisory Council Chair Paul Cherecwich, Jr. is reported to have ob-
served increasing reluctance to invest in tax shelters, which he attributes to the govern-
ment's increased shelter activity). 
47 Weisbach, Ten Truths, note 1, at 229. 
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Furthermore, consideration of deterrence should not be limited to 
whether a taxpayer will or will not engage in a tax shelter transaction. 
We should be interested as well in whether disclosure causes the tax-
payer to exercise greater diligence, whether it causes the taxpayer to 
undertake a more careful analysis of the legal merits and risks and, 
very importantly, whether it causes the taxpayer to make certain that 
the facts as assumed in designing a tax-minimization scheme are the 
actual facts of the transaction in which the taxpayer engages and that 
the actual facts are adequately documented. 
Lacking the ability to factually document taxpayer behavior, I refer 
to the compliance literature for guidance on the likely effect. My lim-
ited review of the literature does not add much to the deterrence anal-
ysis. I reviewed two categories of analyses, nontax literature that 
deals primarily with the deterrence effect of public disclosure and 
some of the tax compliance literature that addresses the relationship 
between detection and compliance. 
1. Public Disclosure 
Certain nontax public disclosure literature asserts the existence of a 
positive relationship between disclosure and the behavior of the dis-
closing party. Because the disclosure is public, however, the literature 
tends to focus on the impact of the marketplace rather than govern-
ment mandate as the incentive for extracting meaningful information 
from the disclosing party.48 For example, if public disclosure is per-
ceived by securities issuers to be beneficial to potential investors, and 
if issuers risk ex post private action fraud claims in the event of inade-
quate disclosure, then issuers have incentives to accurately disclose. 
Even here, the literature is not conclusive; indeed, some of the com-
mentary suggests that public disclosure may not have a positive be-
havioral effect.49 
48 See Gary Biglaiser & John K. Horowitz, Pollution, Public Disclosure, and FIrm Be-
havior, 5 J. Reg. Econ. 303, 304 (1993); Robert W. Ingram & Eugene G. Chewning, The 
Effect of Fmancial Disclosure Regulation on Security Market Behavior, 58 Acct. Rev. 562 
(1983) (both linking the effect of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 to the supply of 
information to market investors); see also John H. Evans III, Yuhchang Hwang, Nandu 
Nagarajan & Karen Shastri, Involuntary Benchmarking and Quality Improvement: The 
Effect of Mandated Public Disclosure on Hospitals, 12 J. Acct., Auditing & FIn. 315, 341 
(1997) (suggesting a link between mandated external reporting and managerial behavior 
designed to improve quality and productivity). 
49 Biglaiser & Horowitz, note 48, at 312 (potential misallocation of publicly disclosed 
pollution permits due to signaling to competitors); Cheryl J. Wachenheim & Eric A. 
DeVuyst, Strategic Response to Mandatory Reporting Legislation in the U.S. Livestock 
and Meat Industries: Are Collusive Opportunities Enhanced?, 17 Agribusiness 177 (2001) 
(uncertain effect of mandatory public reporting of livestock and meat sales information). 
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Analyses suggesting that public disclosure may have a positive de-
terrence effect are not helpful in determining whether a link exists 
between tax return disclosure and tax compliance because return dis-
closures are confidential50 and, thus, ordinarily are not the subject of 
public scrutiny. Indeed, a taxpayer's incentives to voluntarily disclose 
information to the Service or to enthusiastically comply with the letter 
of a mandatory disclosure requirement are the opposite of the incen-
tives that operate in a marketplace that employs disclosure as an in-
centive. Tax return disclosure increases the chance that a revenue 
agent will obtain information necessary to successfully challenge a 
transaction, thereby increasing the disclosing party's tax liability and 
decreasing its after-tax income. Absent some cost for failing to dis-
close, there is no financial reason for a taxpayer to provide such a 
roadmap to the Service. Thus, I do not find the nontax public disclo-
sure literature helpful. 
There is, however, one link to public disclosure that may be rele-
vant in designing a tax shelter disclosure regime. There appears to be 
a strong association between public information disclosure, that is, 
non tax information reporting by public companies, and high tax com-
pliance.51 Presumably, these taxpayers realize that more information 
will be available to the revenue agent or conclude that it will be more 
difficult to reconcile differences in public nontax disclosures that are 
available to a revenue agent and their tax returns. 
2. Detection and Compliance 
Contemporary tax compliance analysis rejects the application of a 
constrained criminal behavior model based on self-interest in which 
the taxpayer simply compares the income-maximizing benefits of non-
compliance with the various costs of detection in favor of an analysis 
that considers other variables, such as the tax administrator's ability to 
detect underreporting and the tax law's penalty regime.52 Neverthe-
less, there is extensive commentary on the effect on taxpayer behavior 
of the probability of detection and the likelihood of audit.53 This com-
mentary suggests a weak relationship between high individual audit 
50 IRC § 6103(a). 
51 Eric M. Rice, The Corporate Tax Gap: Evidence on Tax Compliance by Small Corpo-
rations, in Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement 125, 127, 152 (Joel 
Slemrod ed., 1992). 
52 Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, The Economics of Tax Compliance: Fact and 
Fantasy, 38 Nat'l Tax J. 355, 357-59 (1985). 
53 For a summary of the commentary, see Robert Kemp, Philip M.J. Reckers & c. Ed-
ward Arrington, U.S. Tax Reform: Tax Evasion Concerns, 21 Bus. Econ. 55 (1986). 
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rates and increased individual compliance.54 There appears to be a 
strong correlation, however, between increased compliance and spe-
cific forms of mandated disclosure that make noncompliance more 
visible to the Service.55 Third-party information reporting is the clear-
est example of a mandated disclosure requirement that has increased 
compliance.56 
The analysis of the deterrence effect of tax return disclosure is very 
limited. Although my search was not exhaustive, I am aware of only 
one study that analyzes the effect of mandated return disclosure, and 
it is of little help in analyzing an enhanced tax shelter disclosure re-
gime. The study analyzed the behavioral responses to the TINS for 
TOTS legislation enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.57 
This legislation, now contained in § 151(e) in expanded form, man-
dated the inclusion of the taxpayer identification number of every de-
pendent over five years of age who was claimed as a dependent on the 
tax return.58 The legislative history contains conflicting descriptions 
of the behavior that Congress sought to alter. Two members of the 
Senate, where the provision was added as a floor amendment, re-
ferred to dual claims for a child's dependency exemption by parents 
following separation or divorce.59 Another Senator suggested a 
broader abuse in his statement that the amendment "will deter people 
from claiming dependent deductions for phantom children."6o 
Even though the penalty for failing to comply with the TIN require-
ment was very low ($5 for each omission61), the apparent behavioral 
response to the legislation was quite significant. A study published by 
54 Helen V. Tauchen, Ann Dryden Witte & Kurt J. Beron, Tax Compliance: An Investi-
gation Using Individual Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) Data, 9 J. 
Quantitative Criminology 177, 199 (1993) (suggesting the potential for a higher correlation 
in the case of high income individual taxpayers if the Service were to direct greater audit 
resources to this group). 
55 Taxpayer Compliance: An Agenda for Research 27-8 (Jeffrey A. Roth, John T. 
Scholz & Ann Dryden Witte eds., 1989). 
56 Id. at 107; James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. 
Econ. Lit. 818, 821 (1998); Alfred Blumstein, Models for Structuring Taxpayer Compli-
ance, in Income Tax Compliance: A Report of the ABA Section of Taxation Invitational 
Conference on Income Tax Compliance 159, 162 (1983). 
57 John A. Szilagyi, Where Have All The Dependents Gone?, in IRS, 1990 Update: 
Trend Analyses and Related Statistics 63 (1990). 
58 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1524(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2749 (IRC 
§ 6109( e) before repeal in 1996). The age requirement was lowered from five to two by the 
Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100485, § 704, 102 Stat. 2343, 2427-28. The provi-
sion was broadened in 1996 to apply to claims for exemptions for all dependents, regard-
less of age. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1615, 110 
Stat. 1755, 1853-54 (repealing § 6109(e); codified as amended in § 151(e». 
59 132 Congo Rec. 14,498 (Sen. Gramm), 14,500 (Sen. Moynihan) (1986). 
60 Id. at 14,501 (Sen. Durenberger). 
61 IRC § 6109(e). 
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the IRS Research Division in 1990 reported that dependent exemp-
tions claimed on 1987 tax returns, the first year in which the predeces-
sor to § 151(e) was effective, were 7 million less than projected.62 
Since the comparison in the study was between exemptions claimed 
and exemptions estimated, it is not possible to conclude that claimed 
exemptions actually were reduced by 7 million; it is only an estimate. 
Based on the 69.7 million exemptions claimed,63 however, the esti-
mated reduction is quite significant. Moreover, the study's analysis of 
the 1986 and 1987 tax returns of specific taxpayers provided even 
more compelling evidence of changes in taxpayer behavior. In the 
case of 11,627 returns, reported dependents decreased seven or more, 
and decreases from four to six dependents were reported on an addi-
tional 66,612 returns.64 
The Service's 1990 TINS for TOTS study suggests the compliance 
potential of disclosure. For several reasons, however, caution is in or-
der. As the study indicates, following enactment, the Service and the 
Social Security Administration undertook a vigorous educational cam-
paign to familiarize taxpayers with the new law, including direct mail 
notifications of the change to selected taxpayers. The Service also un-
dertook an aggressive enforcement effort, including referral of 4 % of 
closed returns (approximately 34 taxpayers) to the Criminal Investiga-
tion Division for possible fraud prosecution.65 Thus, it is not clear 
whether enactment of the new mandate caused the change in behavior 
or whether it was the Service's outreach and enforcement efforts that 
caused the change. But, when coupled with the newly enacted man-
dated disclosure, it is fairly clear that the law had a significant deter-
rence effect. Because the study relates only to individual taxpayers, it 
provides only indirect insight on the possible deterrence effect of dis-
closure by corporate taxpayers, and it is likely that the study does not 
provide much insight regarding high net worth individuals. 
I have found no direct analysis of the deterrence effect of disclosure 
on business taxpayers generally or on corporations. Apparently, one 
such study is in process and might prove relevant. The Service is re-
ported to have commissioned an independent confidential random 
survey of 1,400 large corporate taxpayers to determine the extent to 
which these taxpayers are documenting their transfer pricing method-
ologies in order to satisfy the documentation prong of the exception to 
62 Szilagyi, note 57, at 63. 
63 Id. at 64. 
64 Id. at 69-70. 
65 Id. at 70. 
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the substantial valuation misstatement penalty.66 The Senate Appro-
priations Committee requested the study in 1999.67 
Further analysis of the deterrence function of return disclosure, par-
ticularly on business taxpayers, and on decisions regarding tax shelter 
activities, is necessary before it is possible to assert more confidently 
the existence of a disclosure-compliance link. Sufficient anecdotal ev-
idence exists that disclosure play have a deterrence effect in these cir-
cumstances. Therefore, I think it is appropriate to take the effect into 
consideration in evaluating the desirability of enhanced disclosure and 
in reviewing alternative disclosure regimes. 
III. MAKING DISCLOSURE WORK: DISCLOSURE INCENTIVES 
It is clear that mandated disclosure will be effective only if taxpay-
ers comply with the mandate. Therefore, policymakers must assure 
that sufficient incentives exist to encourage voluntary compliance with 
the disclosure requirements. This final Section considers possible 
incentives. 
Perhaps the mere existence of an enhanced disclosure requirement 
combined with vigorous enforcement by the Service by means of pre-
dictable audits would cause taxpayers to take greater care in under-
taking tax shelter transactions that comply with current law even in 
the absence of a civil or criminal penalty for willfully failing to dis-
close.68 This result would appear to be more likely when the reduced 
avoidance opportunity results from third-party disclosure, such as 
wage ,vithholding or dividend and interest reporting. For this reason, 
the registration requirement imposed on tax shelter organizers under 
§ 6111 may serve a particularly useful function in the limited situa-
tions in which it applies. Not all questionable transactions, however, 
result from confidential tax shelter products "purchased" by the tax-
payer from a promoter. Some will be self-generated; others will be 
based on the advice of the taxpayer's regular outside advisors. In such 
cases, the promoter registration rules of § 6111 will serve as no deter-
rent whereas some form of disclosure by the taxpayer may, provided 
that taxpayers comply with the disclosure mandate. 
The following discussion refers to certain other potential disclosure 
incentives, including (1) relief from the accuracy-related penalty, (2) 
66 IRC § 6662(e)(3)(B). 
67 See Amy Hamilton, IRS to Conduct Confidential Transfer Pricing Documentation 
Survey, 92 Tax Notes 1273 (Sept. 3, 2001); Amy Hamilton, No Additional Transfer Pricing 
Survey Scheduled, IRS Says, 2001 TNT 173-4, Sept. 6,2001, available at LEXIS, Tax Ana-
lysts File. 
68 ABA Comm'n on Taxpayer Compliance, Report and Recommendations: July 1987, 
at 19 (Tax Mgmt. Educ. Inst. 1987) (reducing opportunity will reduce noncompliance even 
absent fear of increased penalties). 
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.D. Tax Law Review 
HeinOnline -- 55 Tax L. Rev. 312 2001-2002
312 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55: 
determination that a return, which does not include a disclosure state-
ment or includes an incomplete disclosure statement, is not a com-
plete and timely filed return, (3) the imposition of civil or criminal 
penalties on the taxpayer in the event of noncompliance with the dis-
closure requirements, (4) the imposition of civil or criminal penalties 
on the taxpayer's agents, and (5) public disclosure of information re-
garding penalties imposed on the taxpayer or its agents. Perception of 
a moral obligation to comply with the tax law also may constitute an 
important incentive.69 In fact, I think a sense of a moral obligation 
causes many business taxpayers to comply with the law. For purposes 
of this discussion, however, I adopt a more cynical view. 
A. Relief From the Accuracy-Related Penalty 
A two-tiered increase in the rate of the accuracy-related penalty 
from 20% to 40% in the case of a so-called "tax shelter understate-
ment," with relief granted from the 40% rate if, inter alia, the tax-
payer adequately discloses the facts of the transaction, is a central 
feature of the Finance Committee 2001 Discussion DrafUo On its 
face, relief from the penalty when a transaction is disclosed may have 
the desired incentive effect. 
I have three reservations about a link between the accuracy-related 
penalty and disclosure. First, I expect that the Service would be very 
reluctant to assess a 40% penalty and would do so only in rare circum-
stances, even if the penalty is not subject to a reasonable cause excep-
tion. With the exception of the 20% accuracy-related negligence 
penalty imposed on Compaq Computer Corporation and upheld by 
the Tax Court although later reversed,?1 I am not aware of the imposi-
tion of an accuracy-related penalty on a public corporation, although I 
recognize that available information regarding the imposition of pen-
alties is limited because of the taxpayer privacy rules. If my specula-
tion regarding the Service's reluctance is correct, taxpayers will 
quickly factor this reluctance into their decisionmaking calculus. 
The second reason that I do not favor a link between the accuracy-
related penalty and the disclosure requirement relates to my view that 
69 Economists have taken the tax avoidance and evasion analysis well beyond this for-
mulation. See Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administra-
tion (NBER Working Paper No. W7473, 2000). For an analysis of the motivational effects 
of individuals on tax compliance, see Kathleen M. McGraw & John T. Scholz, Appeals to 
Civic Virtue Versus Attention to Self-Interest: Effects on Tax Compliance, 25 Law & Soc'y 
Rev. 471 (1991). 
70 Finance Committee 2001 Draft, note 30, § 101(a)(1) (proposing amendment to 
§ 6662(a)). 
71 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 113 T.e. 214 (1999), rev'd, 277 F.3d 778 
(5th Cir. 2001). 
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the revenue agent's right to know should not be limited to cases in 
which a questionable transaction is determined to fail under current 
law. As the Seventh Circuit stated in United States v. DiVarco, "In 
light of the need for accurate information . . . so that the Internal 
Revenue Service can police and verify the reporting of individuals and 
corporations, a misstatement ... is a material matter [without regard 
to the existence of a tax liability]."72 
Third, and most importantly, the impact on the scope of disclosure 
because of a link to the accuracy-related penalty is unwelcome. Natu-
rally, policymakers will be sensitive to the category of transactions 
that may be subject to a 40% penalty. Thus, it is likely that the higher 
penalty would apply to a narrower category of transactions. If a 40% 
penalty could be avoided by disclosing the transaction on the tax re-
turn, then it is likely that the category of transactions subject to disclo-
sure would be conformed to the category of transactions to which the 
40% penalty potentially applied. In other words, Congress will seek 
to minimize the number of disclosure standards, if for no other reason 
than to ease compliance with, and administrability of, the rules. Simi-
larly, because the preamble to the temporary regulations warns of a 
link between a failure to disclose and the potential applicability of the 
current accuracy-related and fraud penalties,73 taxpayers and their ad-
visors understandably desire to narrow the category of transactions 
subject to disclosure. 
A disclosure standard linked by legislation or administrative prac-
tice to the accuracy-related penalty will be narrower than it will be if 
disclosure were a freestanding, return-filing requirement with no over-
lapping effect. The narrower the standard, the less utility disclosure 
will have in the audit process. If it were possible to have two tax shel-
ter definitions, a narrow one that applies for purposes of the accuracy-
related penalty and a more expansive one that defines the category of 
transactions subject to disclosure under § 6011, my concern would be 
eliminated. Legislative or administrative adoption of two disclosure 
standards is unlikely, however, as the Finance Committee 2001 Dis-
cussion Draft indicates74 and as the private sector commentary has 
urged. Therefore, I think it is a mistake to link relief from the accu-
racy-related penalty to disclosure. 
72 484 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1973). 
73 Preamble to Temp. Reg. § 1.6011-4T, T.D. 8877, 2000-1 C.B. 747, 747. 
74 Fmance Committee 2001 Draft, note 30, § 101(a)(1) (proposing amendment to 
§ 6662(a». 
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B. Incomplete Return 
Section 1.6011-1(b) of the regulations provides that a tax return that 
does not fully and clearly set forth the required information will not 
be considered to meet the requirements of the Code, presumably in-
cluding the statutory requirement of a timely filed return.75 The regu-
lation is silent on the impact of the omission of a mandated 
attachment to the corporate income tax return, and I have located no 
case in which the adequacy of a corporate return has been rejected 
because of a failure to provide required information.76 Based on ex-
isting authority, I think it is possible to speculate that a corporate in-
come tax return that otherwise is complete would not be characterized 
as an incomplete return merely because the taxpayer failed to com-
plete Schedule M -lor failed to file a mandated tax shelter disclo-
sure.77 Perhaps a sufficient incentive to file would exist, if the Service 
could successfully assert that a return that does not include a man-
dated tax shelter disclosure is not timely filed. I do not think the Ser-
vice would succeed. Moreover, I am not certain that the Service 
should challenge the completeness of such a return; the potential con-
sequences seem disproportionate to the omission. 
C. Criminal Prosecution of the Taxpayer 
It is a misdemeanor under § 7203 to willfully fail to file a return or 
fail to supply information required by the statute or regulations. For 
this purpose, a tax return includes any schedules and statements that 
are required to be filed with the return.78 The Service has successfully 
prosecuted individual tax protestors under § 7203 who filed incom-
plete income tax returns,79 and in Pappas v. United States, the Service 
successfully prosecuted an individual member of a two-person part-
nership under the 1939 Code for intentionally failing to complete bal-
ance sheet information specifically required on the partnership 
return.80 Each of the tax protestor cases involved material omissions 
75 IRC § 6072. 
76 See Jeffrey Loubet, The Willful Failure to Supply Information: The Service's Weap-
ons v. Taxpayers' Rights, 42 J. Tax'n 154, 154 (1975) (possible applicability of IRC § 7203 in 
the case of a failure to supply information). 
77 Cf., Germantown Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 304, 309-10 (1940) (return 
must contain all data necessary to compute tax liability). 
78 See, e.g., United States v. Franks, 723 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir. 1983) (prosecution 
under § 7206(1); taxpayer filed incomplete Form 4683, relating to foreign bank accounts). 
79 See, e.g., United States v. Quimby, 636 F.2d 86, 88 (5th Cir. 1981) (return included 
only the taxpayer's name, address, "other basic identifying information," and a protest 
statement). 
80 216 F.2d 515 (10th Cir. 1954) (enforcing § 145(a) of the 1939 Code, which corresponds 
to § 7203 of the 1986 Code). 
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of income. The conviction in Pappas for omitting return information 
was based on particularly egregious facts. The revenue agents repeat-
edly attempted to obtain balance sheet information from the defen-
dant, and the defendant refused to supply the information, even after 
he was threatened with criminal prosecution.81 Thus, these authorities 
do not provide reliable guidance regarding a court's willingness to up-
hold the conviction of a business taxpayer for failing to attach a tax 
shelter disclosure to its return, particularly if the shelter is not defec-
tive or does not result in a material additional tax liability. 
Notwithstanding the absence of direct authority, the wi11fu1 failure 
to file a mandated disclosure may be the basis for criminal liability 
under § 7203.82 It is possible that the Service will identify situations in 
which taxpayers intentionally chose not to disclose their tax shelter 
activities. In such cases, the wi11fu1 failure to file a tax shelter disclo-
sure statement may give the Service an opportunity to explore the 
scope of § 7203. 
It may be more difficult to allege violation of § 7203 solely on the 
basis that a schedule such as a tax shelter disclosure statement is in-
complete or the information contained in the statement is inaccurate. 
The "tax return" standard articulated by the Supreme Court is 
whether the purported return "contained all of the data from which a 
tax could be computed and assessed. "83 The case law tends to involve 
extremes, where either no meaningful information was provided84 or 
the omissions were minor.85 The Court has held that a bona fide mis-
understanding regarding a taxpayer's duty to supply information re-
quired by an income tax return precludes the necessary finding of 
willfulness required for criminal conviction.86 On the assumption that 
an accused corporate taxpayer could explain the basis for any incom-
plete or inaccurate information and would offer to correct the inaccu-
racies, I can understand the absence of reported cases involving 
81 See also United States v. Pirro, 212 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2000) (omission of Schedule K-l 
from S corporation return); United States v. Taylor, 574 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1978) (failure to 
attach Schedule F to Form 1040; omission of a substantial amount of income was determi-
native); Siravo v. United States, 377 F.2d 469 (1st Cir. 1967) (failure of an individual to 
attach Schedule C to Form 1040; not clear what the court would have decided if the omit-
ted income had not been material). 
82 See United States v. DiVarco, 484 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1973). 
83 Germantown Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 304, 308 (1940). 
84 See, e.g., White v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1126 (1979) (Form 1040 contained only the 
taxpayers' names, address, and Social Security numbers). 
85 See, e.g., McCaskill v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 689 (1981) (otherwise complete individ-
ual returns for four years were held to constitute timely filed returns even though the 
taxpayers reported a net income figure on their Schedules C rather than fully filling out the 
schedules.) 
86 United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933). 
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incomplete corporate returns and the likely reluctance of prosecutors 
to invest resources in pursuing such cases. 
If there is no real threat of criminal prosecution in cases of willful 
noncompliance with a tax shelter disclosure requirement, the price of 
nondisclosure will be limited to the possible imposition of a civil pen-
alty, a potential additional monetary transaction cost. Thus, if return 
disclosure is considered an important audit tool, the Service and the 
Justice Department must be willing in appropriate cases, such as when 
it can be established that the taxpayer was aware of the disclosure 
requirement and chose not to disclose, to seek criminal penalties. 
Failure to do so is a serious abrogation of their law enforcement 
obligation. 
D. Imposition of a Civil Penalty 
Section 6651(a)(1) imposes a penalty for failure to file a timely re-
turn, and § 6652 imposes penalties for failing to file certain specific 
information returns. If a taxpayer timely files a document that is 
deemed a return, there is no civil penalty applicable if the return is 
incomplete.87 Thus, in the absence of legislation, a taxpayer would 
not be subject to a penalty for failing to attach a tax shelter disclosure 
statement to its return as required by the temporary regulations,88 as-
suming that the tax return is deemed to constitute a timely filed re-
turn. This is a very significant defect in current law that should be 
corrected. The Finance Committee 2001 Discussion Draft would ap-
ply a civil penalty in the event of a failure to file the tax shelter disclo-
sure statement. The penalty would be equal to the greater of 5 % of 
any deficiency attributable to a reportable transaction or $100,000, or 
10% of the deficiency or $200,000, in the case of a listed transaction.89 
It is possible that even a penalty as large as that proposed by the 
Finance Committee will not be a sufficient incentive to cause taxpay-
ers to disclose tax-motivated transactions that may result in multimil-
lion dollar tax savings. The proposed penalty, however, is not 
intended as a punishment for engaging in the transaction; the accu-
racy-related penalty serves that purpose. Rather, the penalty is in-
tended merely as a sanction for nondisclosure. As such, it needs to be 
measured in amount. Although $100,000 may not be sufficient, it cer-
87 The 1994 GAO Report notes the absence of a penalty for willfully failing to provide 
requested information in connection with a corporate audit. GAO Report, note 18, at 56. 
The Service has threatened imposition of a negligence penalty when sole proprietors failed 
to file a separate Schedule C for their separate businesses. Rev. Rul. 81-90, 1981-1 C.B. 
572. No similar threat has been made regarding schedules or mandated attachments to the 
corporate tax return. 
88 Temporary Regulations, note 3. 
89 Finance Committee 2001 Draft, note 30, § 102 (proposing § 6707A(b)). 
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tainly is not de minimis, and it should attract the attention of corpo-
rate management and other regulators. 
Conditioning the proposed nondisclosure penalty on the absence of 
substantial authority for a contrary position, or a realistic possibility of 
success on the merits, as recently suggested by the ABA Tax Section,90 
is inconsistent with the principle that the Service is entitled to inquire 
into the specifics of a transaction even if it ultimately is determined to 
comply with existing law. Therefore, I think such a qualification is 
inappropriate. 
I have expressed my concern with a link between the design of an 
enhanced disclosure regime and a redesign of the accuracy-related 
penalty.91 I recognize that the link is a good-faith effort to craft a 
meaningful disclosure incentive, and I have no basis for concluding 
that relief from a much higher deficiency-related penalty would not 
provide an effective incentive. An important consequence of the link, 
however, is the pressure that it places on the definition of the class of 
disclose able transactions, which in the current debate is coterminous 
with the definition of tax shelter. I am confident that if the link is 
retained, the range of discloseable transactions will be narrowed, 
thereby disadvantaging the audit process. Thus, I believe the tax-writ-
ing committees and Treasury should attempt to separate the disclosure 
requirement, including specifically the definition of discloseable trans-
actions, from changes in the accuracy-related penalty. 
No penalty will provide a compliance incentive if the Service is un-
willing to assert it. The conventional wisdom is that the Service has 
been unwilling to assert a penalty against a publicly-held corporation, 
perhaps fearful that it will be accused of using the penalty as a bar-
gaining chip in the tax audit. The Service's action in Compaq92 is a 
departure from this apparent past practice and, thus, is a significant 
development. Indeed, a senior Service official stated that the Tax 
Court's imposition of the penalty in Compaq will cause the Service to 
be less hesitant to impose penalties against large corporations.93 This 
statement preceded the recent reversal of the Tax Court's decision.94 
Thus, time will tell. 
90 ABA Comments, note 26. 
91 See text accompanying notes 71-74. 
92 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 214 (1999), rev'd, 277 F.3d 778 
(5th Cir. 2001). 
93 Sheryl Stratton, IRS Defends Record on Shelter Cases, 86 Tax Notes 889 (Feb. 14, 
2000) (quoting Cynthia Mattson, then IRS Assistant Chief Counsel (Litigation and Field 
Service». 
94Id. 
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E. Other Disclosure Incentives 
It is possible that no monetary penalty imposed on a corporate or 
other business taxpayer will be sufficient to encourage an acceptable 
level of compliance with enhanced disclosure. Accordingly, it is 
worthwhile to consider other measures that might encourage the 
timely submission of accurate disclosures. I suggest two, public disclo-
sure of failure-to-disclose penalties and personal accountability. 
1. Public Disclosure of the Penalty 
A 1987 individual taxpayer opinion survey conducted for the Ser-
vice by an opinion research firm, Louis Harris and Associates, focused 
on the relevance of public disclosure to individual tax compliance. 
The study indicated that 51 % of the individuals interviewed thought 
that the publication of the names of "tax cheaters" would reduce 
cheating, and 70% thought that pUblicity would serve as additional 
punishment.95 Because the survey involved individual taxpayers, it 
provides no direct insight regarding corporate taxpayers. To my 
knowledge, there exists no tax compliance analysis of the public dis-
closure of a penalty by a large business taxpayer. 
The May 2000 preliminary discussion draft on corporate tax shelters 
prepared by the Finance Committee staff offered the prospect of legis-
lation that would have enabled researchers to fill the data gap. It in-
cluded a provision (proposed § 6116) that would have required a 
corporation to disclose to its shareholders payment of a tax shelter 
understatement penalty in excess of $1 million.96 The Finance Com-
mittee 2001 Discussion Draft contains a different penalty structure, 
including a penalty for failure to include a tax shelter disclosure with 
the return (proposed § 6707 A), but it does not include a shareholder 
disclosure requirement.97 
Recently, the Service publicly announced an agreement with Merrill 
Lynch that resulted in a "substantial payment" to resolve issues relat-
ing to tax shelter registration penalties.98 The announcement presum-
ably was made with Merrill Lynch's consent but likely resulted from 
the Service's insistence. If penalties are imposed on other business 
taxpayers and similar public disclosures follow, or if the Securities and 
Exchange Commission were to require reporting companies to refer-
95 Louis Harris & Assocs., 1987 Taxpayer Opinion Survey 95 (1988). 
96 Staff of the Senate Finance Comm., 106th Cong., Corporate Tax Shelter Preliminary 
Discussion Draft (May 24, 2000), 2000 TNT 102-9, May 25, 2000, available at LEXIS, Tax 
Analysts File [hereinafter Finance Committee 2000 Draft]. 
97 Finance Committee 2001 Draft, note 30. 
98 IRS, Merrill Lynch Reach Agreement on Tax Shelter Penalties (Aug. 28,2001),2001 
1NT 168-11, Aug. 29, 2001, available at LEXIS, Tax Analysts File. 
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ence the imposition of a tax shelter disclosure penalty in public docu-
ments, it may be possible to evaluate the deterrence effect. 
Perhaps large, sophisticated promoters and taxpayers, particularly 
large corporate taxpayers, will not be deterred even if their names are 
disclosed. Indeed, public disclosure of tax shelter activity may be per-
ceived as a badge of courage. The Service, however, must have 
thought that disclosure of the Merrill Lynch settlement could have 
some deterrence effect, and the press release did result in relatively 
prominent publicity, including an article in the Wall Street Journal 
under the headline, "Settlement May Signal Similar Future Actions 
Against Other Firms."99 Moreover, the Tax Executives Institute criti-
cized the Finance Staff's proposal to disclose penalties in excess of $1 
million,100 and the Tax Fairness Coalition characterized the proposal 
as a "troublesome precedent by giving the tax-writing committees di-
rect jurisdiction required by the securities law."lOl These protesta-
tions may be some evidence of sensitivity to public disclosure within 
the business community. 
2. Personal Accountability 
A corporate taxpayer that decides to engage in a tax shelter transac-
tion may choose not to comply with a disclosure requirement, and, 
instead, risk the imposition of a monetary penalty if the nondisclosure 
is detected. After all, it is only money. But what if risk is imposed on 
one or more of the corporation's officers or members of its board of 
directors? If they are subject to some form of personal liability, might 
the individuals' potential liability cause a change in the corporate tax-
payer's behavior? 
Section 6062 requires a corporate officer to sign the corporate tax 
return, and § 6065 requires that the return be verified under the pen-
alties of perjury. In addition, § 7206(1) imposes criminal liability in 
the case of a willfully false declaration. Thus, theoretically under the 
authority of § 7206(1), the Service could prosecute a corporate officer 
who signs a tax return under penalties of perjury if the return does not 
include a mandated tax shelter disclosure statement or contains an 
99 Smith & McKinnon, note 19, at Cl. 
100 Charles W. Shewbridge, III, Int'l. Pres., TEl, Comments on Senate Fmance Commit-
tee Preliminary Staff Discussion Draft on Corporate Tax Shelters (July 20, 2000), 2000 
TNT 141-18, July 21, 2000, available at LEXIS, Tax Analysts File (potential deleterious 
effect of breaching taxpayer confidentiality). 
101 LaBrenda Garrett-Nelson, Gary Gasper, Nick Giordano, Mark Weinberger, Wash-
ington Council Ernst & Young, on Behalf of Tax Fairness Coalition, Comments Regarding 
the Bipartisan Senate Fmance Staff "Preliminary Discussion Draft on Corporate Tax Shel-
ters" (June 13, 2000), 2000 TNT 146-21, July 28, 2000, available at LEXIS, Tax Analysts 
File. 
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inaccurate statement. I have found no evidence of any enforcement 
action against a corporate officer in these circumstances. If prosecu-
tion for violation of the general tax return verification requirement is 
unlikely in the case of such an incompleteness or inaccuracy, might the 
risk of prosecution increase if an officer is required to verify the tax 
shelter disclosure form itself? This question was put in play in the tax 
shelter debate by a proposal to require a senior corporate officer to 
verify the accuracy of the enhanced tax shelter disclosure under penal-
ties of perjury. 
In 1999 testimony before the Ways and Means Committee, the 
ABA Tax Section proposed what has become known as the "corpo-
rate officer attestation" requirement.102 Specifically, the Section rec-
ommended that the disclosure form include a statement to be signed 
by the chief financial officer or comparable senior corporate officer 
under penalties of perjury that the facts set forth in the disclosure 
form are true and correct as of the date the return is filed. As ex-
plained in its testimony, the Section thought that an attestation re-
quirement by a senior officer would increase the likelihood that the 
disclosure would be accurate and possibly assure that an increased de-
gree of care would go into consideration of the tax shelter transaction. 
If successful, the attestation would improve the utility of the disclo-
sure statement by a revenue agent and enhance deterrence. Subse-
quently, the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation and the Finance 
Committee 2000 Preliminary Discussion Draft made the same recom-
mendation,103 and Treasury made a similar recommendation.104 
The corporate community's reaction to the corporate officer attes-
tation proposal predictably was negative, and the proposal was not 
included in the Finance Committee Staff 2001 Discussion Draft.lOS 
I consider this deletion unfortunate. 
Not only would a senior corporate officer attestation likely result in 
more careful attention to the completeness and accuracy of the disclo-
sure, but also it would cause more careful consideration of the tax 
shelter transaction prior to the time the corporation engages in the 
activity. Presumably, that is one of the reasons that the chief financial 
officer must sign financial statements of reporting corporations. The 
same approach is appropriate here. 
102 Statement of Paul J. Sax, Chair, ABA Tax Sec., Before House Ways and Means 
Comm. (Nov. 10, 1999), 1999 TNT 216-38, Nov. 9, 1999, available at LEXIS, Tax Analysts 
File. 
103 1 Joint Committee Tax Shelter Study, note 7, at 242-43; Finance Committee 2000 
Draft, note 96 (proposed § 6662A). 
104 Treasury Tax Shelter Study, note 44, at 85-86 ("corporate officer who has, or should 
have, knowledge of the actual underpinnings of the transaction .... "). 
105 Finance Committee 2001 Draft, note 30. 
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Notwithstanding its apparent demise, it is useful to explore the po-
tential impact of agent accountability on corporate compliance with 
an enhanced disclosure requirement. Certain nontax literature sug-
gests that in some instances penalties imposed on an individual agent 
of the corporation may have a greater deterrence effect than a penalty 
imposed on the corporation itself.106 In addition to an individual's 
concern about the financial impact of a monetary penalty or the possi-
bility of incarceration, individuals may be particularly concerned 
about their reputations.107 
The tax law incorporates agent accountability in the § 6065 tax re-
turn verification requirement. There is no case law, however, regard-
ing the applicability of the § 6065 verification requirement in the case 
of an incomplete corporate income tax return, such as one that con-
tains an incomplete Schedule M-1, or in the case of an incomplete or 
inaccurate mandated attachment such as a tax shelter disclosure 
statement. 
Historic lack of prosecution under § 7206(1) in the case of incom-
plete returns may further encourage corporate officers to sign corpo-
rate tax returns that do not include tax shelter disclosures if they 
desire to avoid detection of the tax shelter transactions. As a result, it 
is difficult to predict how a meaningful risk of personal liability may 
impact corporate compliance with a mandated disclosure require-
ment. Therefore, if personal accountability is considered to be an ap-
propriate compliance incentive, it is likely that specific legislation 
requiring officer attestation of the disclosure document itself, as dis-
tinguished from the current § 6065 requirement, will have to be 
enacted. 
Legislative imposition of personal liability would have to include 
safeguards against disclosure errors that are not the fault of the attest-
ing individual. A reasonable cause exception that would enable the 
individual to avoid any penalty when she is able to establish diligence 
in attempting to meet the disclosure requirements should adequately 
serve that purpose. It also would be important to assure as reasonably 
as possible that the proposed imposition of an individual civil or crimi-
nal penalty for failure to comply with a mandated disclosure require-
ment is not used by a revenue agent as a weapon against the corporate 
taxpayer in seeking its agreement to an entity-level penalty or the dis-
position of the underlying substantive issue in a manner favorable to 
the government. Although it would be impossible to provide absolute 
106 Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities 
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. Ill. L. Rev. 691, 709 (1992). 
107 For a review of the shaming penalty literature, see Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming 
Punishments Educate?, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 733 (1998); Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of 
Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3 Psycho!., Pub. Pol'y, & L. 645 (1997). 
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assurance that enforcement efforts against a corporate officer and the 
corporation will not become intertwined, certain administrative ac-
tions could be implanted to substantially reduce the risk. For exam-
ple, different offices and individuals within the Service might handle 
the individual and corporate enforcement actions, communications 
between Service employees responsible for the two actions could be 
prohibited, senior management could be required to review any indi-
vidual enforcement action, and Treasury's Inspector General for Tax 
Administration and the Joint Committee on Taxation staff could use 
their oversight authority to determine how the Service was adminis-
tering individual enforcement authority. 
F. IRS Audit Activity 
A perfectly-designed mandated disclosure requirement and an ideal 
set of penalties and other incentives will not cause taxpayers to take 
the disclosure requirement seriously unless the Service undertakes a 
vigorous audit program of which taxpayers, large and small, incorpo-
rated and unincorporated, are aware. Taxpayers and their representa-
tives will quickly determine if an enhanced disclosure document 
constitutes an unused piece of paper. If so, efforts expended to de-
velop a meaningful disclosure regime will be wasted. 
G. The Need for Implementing Regulations and Legislation 
Weisbach asserts that congressional action or even lengthy regula-
tions are not necessary to give better documents to auditors. He 
thinks that changes to the forms and existing recordkeeping require-
ments would suffice.108 I agree with his observation regarding con-
gressional action relating to the design of an enhanced disclosure 
regime. Treasury possesses clear statutory authority under § 6011 to 
require taxpayers to provide information deemed necessary to deter-
mine tax liability. Indeed, I would go further than Weisbach by op-
posing legislation that imposes a specific disclosure regime. Intrusion 
by Congress in tax administration by insisting on a modification to a 
tax return or requiring the submission of additional return informa-
tion puts in question Treasury's authority under § 6011 and represents 
undesirable micromanagement. To its credit, Treasury did not wait for 
Congress in developing and implementing enhanced tax shelter disclo-
sure under its general regulatory authority. I would prefer to see Con-
gress exercise an oversight role. Therefore, unless the temporary 
regulations are watered down to the point that they will be ineffective, 
108 Weisbach, Ten Truths, note 1, at 227. 
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Congress should let the Service and Treasury exercise their 
responsibilities. 
I do not agree with Weisbach that legislation relating to disclosure is 
unnecessary. At a minimum, legislation must be enacted to authorize 
the imposition of a penalty for failure to comply with a mandated dis-
closure. Indeed, I suggest that the legislation should be broadened to 
authorize the imposition of a penalty whenever a taxpayer fails to pro-
vide mandated return information whether related to tax shelters or 
othenvise. I also am less comfortable with Weisbach's statement re-
garding the sufficiency of changes in tax forms or existing recordkeep-
ing requirements ,vithout a foundation in the regulations.lo9 There is 
precedent for using regulations to impose recordkeeping and report-
ing requirements even when the Code does not mandate promulga-
tion of regulations.110 Regulations put the full force and effect of the 
Secretary's authority under § 6011 behind the disclosure regime and 
are likely to receive greater deference from the courts. In addition, 
the regulations process assures receipt and consideration of private 
sector comment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As the reader has undoubtedly noted, this is an advocacy piece. I 
argue that a properly designed tax shelter disclosure regime would 
constitute a powerful tax enforcement tool and would result in en-
hanced compliance and deterrence. Indeed, I suspect that the tempo-
rary regulations already have affected compliance. In advocating this 
view, I also acknowledge the absence of relevant empirical analysis 
establishing the efficacy of mandated return disclosure by business en-
terprises, and, thus, the possibility that my assertions are incorrect. 
Implementing enhanced disclosure entails some risk. There is a risk 
that disclosure will be unproductive. There is a risk that disclosure 
will be counterproductive if, for example, the Service is swamped in 
paper. There is a risk of an added compliance burden on taxpayers. 
There also are positive tradeoffs. Enhanced disclosure may substan-
tially improve the quality of the audit process by better informing rev-
enue agents. Further, it may cause taxpayers to exercise greater care 
in deciding whether to engage in a particular tax shelter transaction in 
the first place and in designing and documenting transactions that 
they do undertake. I believe that the risks of overstating disclosure's 
potential are outweighed by the possibility of significant gains. 
109 Id. 
110 See, e.g., Reg. § 1.274-5 (travel and entertainment expenses), § 1.6038-2 (certain af-
filiated foreign corporations). 
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Weisbach's plea for substantive law change is not incompatible with 
this view. There need be no single answer to the tax shelter problem; 
indeed, I think there is none. Rather, the tax shelter problem de-
mands a multifaceted response, and more effective enforcement is a 
vitally important part of the response. Research regarding the effec-
tiveness of disclosure in the case of business taxpayers essentially is 
nonexistent. The current tax shelter environment provides a labora-
tory in which to evaluate the effectiveness of disclosure, an evaluation 
that has implications well beyond the subject at hand. 
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